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Abstract 
We utilize a simple overlapping generations model with a balanced budget rule to study 
the effect of distortionary taxation on cycles and local stability of equilibria. We show 
that under proportional taxation there is a critical tax rate above which cycles will vanish, 
while in the case of linearly progressive taxation there is a critical level of exemption 
below which cycles will vanish as well. Hence, a sufficiently high tax rate and a low tax 
progression eliminate cycles. If the lifetime utility function is quasi-linear, increasing the 
tax rate can cause the economy to become locally unstable both with proportional and 
linearly progressive taxation so that tax exemption does not matter. Finally, if the lifetime 
utility function is not quasi-linear, for small tax rates an increase in progression can 
locally destabilize the economy.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Macroeconomists have long been interested in studying the stabilizing effect of different 
policies. More than fifty years ago Friedman (1948) advocated a non-discretionary 
monetary and fiscal framework for stability. It is not, however, always the case that 
fluctuations are bad for welfare, since the equilibria associated with stable cycles can be 
efficient. The resulting indeterminacy, however, can be an independent reason for 
stabilization policy. An appropriate policy can render the equilibrium determinate, and 
thus possibly rid the economy from the effects of sunspots and bubbles.1 
The possibility of cycles in simple overlapping generations models was observed 
by Gale (1973) and Cass, Okuno and Zilcha (1979). Grandmont (1985) elaborated their 
finding, and analyzed the conditions for the existence of cycles in a precise manner. From 
the policy point of view Grandmont (1986b) pointed out that simple fiscal and monetary 
policies involving proportional transfers and lump-sum taxes (or transfers) can abolish 
the cycles completely. In his demonstration of sunspot equilibria Aiyagari (1988) showed 
that there is a simple policy of proportional tax rate and lump-sum transfers, which can 
stabilize the asset price completely, and thus rid the economy from the effects of 
sunspots. Goenka (1994) advocated a role for discretionary policies in a general 
equilibrium model with public goods to abolish the sunspot equilibria, and thus stabilize 
the economy. Ghiglino and Tvede (2000) studied a general overlapping generations 
model with a prescribed objective function for the government. They showed that if the 
discount factor is close to one, the optimal policy can completely stabilize the economy.  
 There is a related literature, in which the role of various tax schemes as stabilizing 
or destabilizing devices has been analysed in models with inefficiencies and/or 
externalities. It is well known that one-sector real business cycle models with increasing 
returns to scale may generate cycles driven by animal spirits. Guo and Lansing (1998) 
showed that a progressive income tax schedule can stabilize the economy against animal 
spirits type sunspot fluctuations. This is opposite to what happens in an economy with a 
proportional or regressive tax schedule, when the economy becomes more susceptible to 
                                                               
1 Woodford (1984) provides an excellent exposition of indeterminacy and related issues in overlapping 
generations models.  
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indeterminacy. Guo (1999) proved the same result for progressive labour taxation, even 
when the capital tax rate is proportional.  In contrast to these results, Guo and Harrison 
(2001) have used a two-sector real business cycle model with investment externalities to 
show that a regressive tax policy can stabilize the economy against fluctuations driven by 
agents’ animal spirits, while an economy with a proportional or progressive tax scheme is 
more prone to sunspot fluctuations.  
There is also a recent literature, where tax progression has not been an important 
issue for stabilization. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) showed in a neoclassical growth 
model that a balanced budget rule may be destabilizing if fiscal policy relies heavily on 
changes in labour tax rates to achieve budget balance by making higher tax rates self-
fulfilling. Guo and Lansing (2001) developed a discrete time one-sector growth model 
with a productive externality to examine numerically the implications of various 
government fiscal policies for endogenous fluctuations including different types of 
cycles, quasi-periodic orbits and chaos.    
In the real business cycle models, with inefficiencies and/or externalities, 
summarized briefly above, the stabilizing role of proportional and non-proportional taxes 
is sensitive to the details of model specifications. In this paper we re-examine these issues 
in a simple overlapping generations model without inefficiencies or externalities.  We do 
not allow lump sum taxes, but in contrast to Grandmont (1986) and Aiyagari (1988) 
assume that government must use distortionary taxes to maintain balanced budget. More 
precisely, we analyse the impact of proportional and linearly progressive taxes on cycles 
and the local stability of equilibria.    
We show the following results. Under proportional taxation the steady state 
supply exceeds (falls short of) the one without taxation, if the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of the second period consumption, is higher (lower) than one. This is because the 
higher (lower) steady state supply in the presence of taxation is due to the fact that the 
positive income effect of the tax rate dominates (is dominated by) the negative 
substitution effect. In the presence of cycles, there is a critical level of tax rate above 
which there are no cycles. Under progressive taxation the steady state supply is less than 
the one with proportional taxation due to the negative income effect of tax exemption on 
supply. In this case we show that there is a critical level of tax exemption, such that for 
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all tax exemptions below that level there are no cycles in the economy. Hence, a 
sufficiently high tax rate and a low tax progression eliminate cycles.  
We also characterize the effects of tax policy on the local stability of equilibria, 
and show the following results. First, if the lifetime utility function is quasi-linear, 
increasing the tax rate can cause the economy to become locally unstable both with 
proportional and linearly progressive taxation so that tax exemption does not matter. This 
is because the income effect of tax exemption is zero for consumption.  Second, if the 
lifetime utility function is not quasi-linear, we show that for small tax rates an increase in 
progression can locally destabilize the economy.   
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we present an overlapping generations model 
with a balanced budget fiscal policy. Section 3 characterizes competitive equilibrium 
with proportional taxation, the relationship between the level of taxes and cycles, and the 
impact of tax policy on the local stability of equilibria. In section 4 we ask what are the 
implications of linearly progressive taxation on cycles and local stability. Finally there is 
a concluding section. 
 
2. An Overlapping Generations Model with Fiscal Policy 
 
We consider a simple overlapping generations model without population growth, with 
perfect foresight, and a constant stock of money. Producer-consumers consume when old 
and produce when young. The person born at t  has the following additively separable 
lifetime utility function 
(1) )()(),( 11 tttt nvcuncU -= ++ , 
where 1+tc denotes consumption when old, and tn  labor supply in youth. Labor is 
transformed to output, ty , in a linear fashion so that tt ny = , while )(cu  is an increasing 
strictly concave function, and )(nv  an increasing strictly convex function. We denote the 
upper bound for the available time by L , and make the following assumptions: 
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.  Given our 
assumptions it follows that 1)0('/)0(' <uv . This means that the slope of the indifference 
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curve at the endowment point is less than unity. This assumption is needed for monetary 
equilibria in this model. Using the terminology in Gale (1973) we have  here a Samuelson 
case.  
 We consider a simple fiscal policy with a balanced budget, where government 
taxes the output (income) produced by the young, and uses the proceeds to buy output 
from the market. We study the potential effects of taxation both in terms of the 
relationship between tax level and cycles as well as in terms of local stability of 
equilibria, and compare the results of proportional taxation with those of progressive 
taxation.  
To study the effects of progressive taxation in a simple manner we assume that 
there is a nominal exemption on the taxable income and a constant marginal tax rate, i.e. 
tt "= tt .
2  Total tax revenues in period t  are thus 
(2) )( tttt EnpT -= t , 
where ttnp  is the nominal tax base (i.e. price times output of the young), and tE  denotes 
the nominal exemption, which we assume to be constant as well, i.e. tEEt "= . The 
average tax rate equals ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-=
tt
ttt np
E
npT 1/ t , which is less than the marginal tax ratet .   
The tax schedule (2) is progressive in the sense that even though the marginal tax rate is 
constant, the average tax rate increases with the tax base. 3 An increase in the average tax 
rate is higher the higher is the marginal tax rate and tax exemption when the tax base 
goes up.  
The government budget constraint in the absence of debt financing is 
(3)  )( EnpTgp ttttt -== t . 
We emphasize that the real government expenditure, tg , is not a given sequence, but it 
adjusts every period to the level necessary to maintain balanced budget. 
 With proportional taxation the government budget constraint is 
                                                               
2 For the definition of progressive taxation, see the seminal paper by Musgrave and Thin (1948). See also 
Lambert (1993), chapters 6-8, for further analyses, Sandmo (1983) and Koskela and Vilmunen (1995) for 
various applications.  
3 Guo and Lansing (1998, 2001) parametrize tax progression such that both the marginal and average tax 
rates will increase with the tax base. See also Guo (1999) and Guo and Harrison (2001).     
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(4)    tt ng t= . 
 
3. Competitive Equilibrium with Proportional Taxation 
 
In this section we provide the answers to the following questions. First, under what 
conditions are there cycles in the model? Second, can the proportional taxation eliminate 
cycles. And third, what is the effect of the tax rate on the local stability of equilibrium.  
We first study the properties of competitive equilibrium in the presence of 
proportional taxation. The private sector periodic budget constraints are  
(5i) dttt Mnp =- )1( t  
(5ii)  dttt Mcp =++ 11 , 
from where we have the lifetime constraint as 
(6)   t
t
t
t np
pc
1
1
)1(
+
+
-= t . 
The young producers accumulate money by selling their output to the old, and part of it 
to the government. The first-order condition for the utility maximization subject to  
budget constraints (5i) and (5ii) is  
(7)  )('
)1(
'
)1(
11
tt
t
t
t
t nvn
p
p
u
p
p
=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ --
++
tt
. 
The solution to (7) gives the young’s supply function ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ -
=
+1
)1(
t
t
t p
p
nn
t
. If supply is 
increasing in the after tax real wage ( 1/)1( +- tt pp t ), a rise in the tax rate will decrease 
supply, while the reverse happens if supply is downward sloping. 
 The equilibrium condition for the goods market is  
(8)  tt
t
d
t ng
p
M
=+-1 . 
Taking into account the government budget constraint, (4), and the fact that the nominal 
money supply is constant, we rewrite (8) as 
(9) t
t
n
p
M
)1( t-= . 
 6 
Using equation (9) in the first-order condition (7) we can re -express it as 
(10)   [ ] )(')1(')1( 11 tttt nvnnun =-- ++ tt , 
This equation determines the equilibrium sequence of supplies for a given tax rate, and 
implicitly defines the reflected generational offer curve.4  
If the second period utility function, )( 1+tcu , is logarithmic, the proportional tax 
rate will have no effect on the equilibrium sequence. The dynamics is then determined 
from the condition 1)(' =tt nvn , so that the economy stays forever at the steady state, nˆ , 
determined from 1)ˆ('ˆ =nvn . 
 In order to explore the impact of fiscal policy we first ask: How does the steady 
state solution to (10) (denoted by nˆ ) compare to the steady state supply without 
proportional taxation, *n . The answer is given in  
 
Proposition 1. Under proportional taxation the steady state supply exceeds (falls short 
of) the one without taxation, if the elasticity of the marginal utility of the second 
period consumption (or the Arrow-Pratt measure of the relative risk aversion), 
denoted by s , is higher (lower) than one, i.e. 
                                                 *ˆ nn
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 Proof: Rewriting equation (10) in the steady state as 
[ ] )()(')1(')1();( nRHSnvnunLHS º=--º ttt and given the Inada conditions we have 
0)0( =RHS  and ¥=
®
)(lim nRHS
Ln
, and 0)(' >nRHS . We also have 0);( <tnLHSn . 
We calculate  [ ] [ ]nnununLHS )1('')1()1(');( ttttt -----= , and re-express 
[ ]( ))(1)1(');( nnunLHS sttt ---= , where [ ] [ ]nunnun )1('/)1('')1()( ttts ----= . Note 
that consumption in steady state is n)1( t- . When 1)( >ns , the curve );( tnLHS  shifts 
up, if the tax rate is raised. The results of Proposition 1 follow from this observation. 
Q.E.D. 
                                                               
4 The geometric techniques of the reflected generational offer curves, developed by Cass, Okuno and Zilcha 
(1979), are useful in characterizing properties of equilibria in many overlapping generations models. 
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  Proposition 1 follows from a property of the Slutsky equation. The higher (lower) 
steady state supply with than without taxation is due to the fact that the positive income 
effect of the tax rate dominates (is dominated by) the negative substitution effect.  The 
Slutsky equation can be written as m
c nnnn -= tt , where 
cnt  is the negative substitution 
effect and mnn-  the positive income effect. The latter (former) effect – evaluated at 
0=m  -  dominates if .1)()( <>ns  (for a precise elaboration of this intuition, see 
Appendix). 
We differentiate (10) to get 
(11)  [ ] [ ]1121
1
)1('')1()1(')1(
)('')('
+++
+
-++--
+
=
ttt
ttt
t
t
nunnu
nvnnv
dn
dn
tttt
. 
 
 
We drop the subscripts and note that the second period consumption equals n)1( t- . 
Equation (11) cannot be signed generally since the sign of the denominator is a priori 
ambiguous. Defining [ ] [ ]{ }nnununD )1('')1()1(')1()( tttt --+--=  we can express it as 
(12)   ( ) [ ][ ] úû
ù
ê
ë
é
-
--
+--=
nu
nnu
nunD
)1('
)1('')1(
1)1(')1()(
t
tt
tt  
Defining the elasticity of the marginal utility of the second period consumption (or the 
Arrow-Pratt measure of the relative risk aversion) as  
( ) ( )[ ]nunnun )1('/)1('')1()( ttts ----= , and using it we can rewrite equation (12) as 
[ ])(1)(')( nnunD s-= . Thus we see that 0)( >nD , when 1)( <ns . This means that it is 
necessary for backward bending offer curve (and indeed for cycles) to have 1)( >ns .5 
To explore the stabilizing effect of proportional taxation on cycles we use the 
following notation in equation (10) above 
(13)   [ ] [ ]nnunU )1(')1(; ttt --º  and )(')( nnvnG º .6 
Since function )(nG is monotone increasing we can invert it, and obtain from (13) the 
following relation 
(14)  [ ]( ) )(; 111 ++- Fº= ttt nnUGn tt . 
                                                               
5 This is well known since the seminal paper by Grandmont (1985).    
6 To explore this issue we follow Grandmont (1986), and partly Aiyagari (1988). 
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which is actually the inverted reflected generational offer curve. Note that this equation 
describes the backward perfect foresight dynamics of equilibrium. The reason for 
studying backward dynamics here is because the properties of )( 1+F tnt  are easier to 
relate to the shape of the reflected generational offer curve than to the respective curve 
for backward bending forward dynamics. If there is no subscript in the RHS of (14) it 
then refers to the case without taxation.  
To make this problem interesting from the point of view of cycles and the effect 
of policies on them we assume that there can be cycles in our model economy. For the 
existence of a two cycle (or a periodic point with period two) it is necessary that function 
)(nF (economy without taxation) is downward sloping. That property, however, is not 
sufficient for periodic solutions of higher order. To have periodic points with period three  
and more, it is necessary that the curve, )( 1+F= tt nn , must be hump-shaped. And more 
precisely, if there are three cycles in the economy without taxation (see Figure 1), there 
must, according to Sarkovskii’s theorem, be periodic solutions of any order higher than 
three.7 It is also well known that cycles in overlapping generations models are intimately 
connected with sunspot equilibria.8 Below we present a parametric specification of our 
model and provide conditions under which we get a hump-shaped offer curve. 
Next we ask: Is there a proportional tax policy, which can eliminate cycles? We 
provide a positive answer in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2. There is a critical level of the proportional tax rate, tˆ , such that for all 
tt ˆ> , there are no cycles in the economy. 
Proof: Let 'n  be the maximum of the function )(nF  such that ')'( nn >F . We see that 
the maximum for the function )(ntF is at )1/(' t-n . The maximizing point of  
)( 1+F tnt can then be increased in such a way that ultimately we have for some t , say tˆ , 
                                                               
7 An elementary discussion and elaboration of Sarkovskii’s theorem can be found e.g. in Holmgren (1996), 
see in particular chapter 5. On the conditions for the existence of cycles of more than two periods in 
economic models, see Grandmont (1986b). 
8 Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) showed that a two cycle is enough for the existence of a stationary 
sunspot equilibrium. Their results were partly refined by Chattopadhyay and Muench (1999).  
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that [ ] )ˆ1/(')ˆ1/(' ttt -<-F nn . It follows that 0)ˆ('1 >F> nt , where nˆ  is the respective 
steady state, which in turn means that there can be no cycles. Q.E.D. 
Hence, according to Proposition 2 a sufficiently high proportional tax rate will 
eliminate cycles by changing the location and slope of the inverted reflected generational 
offer curve. In Figure 1 we have described an economy without taxation but with cycles 
(curve )( 1+F= tt nn ) and an economy with proportional taxation, and with such a policy 
that there can be no cycles (curve )( 1+F= tt nn t ). In the latter case the tax rate is high 
enough to suppress the cycles. The steady state is stable in backward dynamics, and is 
denoted by n)  in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.
*n
'n
tn
1+tn
)( 1+F= tt nn t
)( 1+F= tt nn
nˆ
 
 
To be able to study more precisely the relationship between proportional taxation, 
cycles and local stability of equilibrium, we consider a parametric  example, which allows 
for backward-bending reflected generational offer curve.  We specify the lifetime quasi-
linear utility function9 as follows: The consumption preferences are described by 
)1/()()( 1 ss -+= -accu , where a  denotes a relative luxury of consumption10, and the 
                                                               
9 Quasi-linearity is  often used in the welfare analyses to simplify the presentation, see e.g. Laffont (1988), 
pp.158-161.  
10 For a further discussion of this specification , see e.g. Auerbach and Hines (2001).    
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preferences for disutility of labor are linear, nnv =)( . We assume here tha t 1>s , which 
both lies in conformity with empirics11,  and yields possibly interesting dynamics.  Under 
these specifications the supply function can be written as 
(15)  
)1(
)1(
1
1111
1 t
t ss
-
--=
+
--
+
t
tt R
a
Rn , 
where we have used the notation: 11 / ++ = ttt ppR . Differentiating (15) with respect to the 
interest factor and the tax rate we get 
(16i) 
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t
t
ss . 
These equations show that the interest factor and the tax rate have an opposite effect on 
supply. Clearly, the supply function can be backward bending with respect to the interest 
factor, if 1>s . Hence, given the interest factor, for all the tax rates which fulfill 
1
11
1 -+÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
-
-< tRa
s
s
s
st , the supply function is backward bending with respect to the tax 
rate. This means that decreasing the tax rate will decrease the supply and vice versa. 
 Next we analyze the properties of competitive equilibrium for this example with 
the assumption that 1>s . Utilizing (10) we get in equilibrium 
(17)     [ ] tt
t n
an
n
=
+-
-
+
+
st
t
1
1
)1(
)1(
, 
where we calculate the steady state )1/()1(ˆ
1
1
tt s ---=
-
an . Note that the steady state 
without taxes is an -= 1* . By direct differentiation with respect to the tax rate we can 
see that *ˆ nn > , if 1>s .12 Differentiating (17) we get 
(18)   [ ] 11
1
2
1 )1(
)1()1)(1(
+
+
+
+ +-
-+--=
¶
¶
st
tts
an
an
n
n
t
t
t
t . 
                                                               
11 See e.g. a recent survey by Attanasio (1999).  
12 See Proposition 1. 
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To get the hump-shaped offer curve described in Figure 1, and thus to allow for periodic 
solutions of order higher than two we need to have the maximum of the offer curve, 
)1)(1/( ts --a , to be less than the steady state, )1/()1(
11
tt s ---
-
a . This will lead to 
the following inequality for the tax rate t
s
st
s
ˆ
1
1 =÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
-
-< a . If the tax rate exceeds tˆ , 
there can be no cycles in this economy as noted in Proposition 2 above. 
Finally we explore the local stability of equilibrium. Evaluating the slope of (18) 
at the steady state yields 
(19)    
s
s
t
sts
1
1
1 )1(
)1)(1(
*)(
-
+--
==
¶
¶
+
a
nn
n
n
t
t
t , 
where the numerator should be negative for cycles. Inverting (19) we get the following 
stability condition for the local forward looking perfect foresight dynamics  
(20)  1
)1)(1(
)1(
1
1
->
+--
-
asts
t
s
s
.13 
We can rewrite it as 
(21) 11
)1(
1 1 >-
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
-
-
st
s a , 
which implies that the tax rate must fulfill the following inequality t
s
s
t
s
~
2
1 =÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
-
-<
a
, 
and tt ~ˆ > . According to (21) increasing the tax rate above t~  can make the economy to 
become unstable. Whether this happens depends also on the magnitudes of the relative 
luxury of consumption, ,a  and on the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, s .14 
 
 
  
                                                               
13 It is important to keep in mind here that we are studying forward dynamics. The result in Proposition 2 
was proved by exploring the backward dynamics.  
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4. Competitive Equilibrium with Progressive Taxation 
 
It has been recognized in the earlier literature on fiscal policy that progressive taxation 
operates as an automatic stabilizer to smooth business fluctuations.15 In the real business 
cycle models, summarized in introduction, the stabilizing role of progressive taxation is 
sensitive to the details of model specifications. In this section we re-examine this issue in 
our model and study the effects of linearly  progressive taxation from the same 
perspective as we did for proportional taxation, and compare the results to those 
presented above.  
The private sector periodic budget constraints are now  
(22i)   dttt MEnp =+- tt )1(  
(22ii)  dttt Mcp =++ 11 , 
so that the lifetime constraint is 
(23)  
1
1
)1(
+
+
+-
=
t
tt
t p
Enp
c
tt
. 
The young producers accumulate money by selling their output again to the old, and part 
of it to the government. The first -order condition for the utility maximization subject to 
budget constraints (22i) and (22ii) is  
(24)  )('
)1(')1(
11
t
t
tt
t
t nv
p
Enpu
p
p =÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ +--
++
ttt
, 
which implicitly defines the young’s supply function, ÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ -=
++ 11
,)1(
tt
t
t p
E
p
pnn tt . The 
equilibrium condition in the goods market is again  
(25)  tt
t
d
t ng
p
M =+-1 . 
Taking into account the government budget constraint and the fact that the nominal 
money supply is constant we can rewrite (25) for periods t and t+1 as 
(26)  EnpM tt tt +-= )1( , EnpM tt tt +-= ++ 11 )1( . 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 This can also be seen by differentiating the left-hand side of equation (21) with respect to the tax rate, 
and noting that the partial derivative will be negative. 
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From (26) it follows that 11 ++= tttt npnp , which means that the tax base stays constant 
also outside the steady states. Now we can develop the first-order condition above as 
(27)  )(''
)1(
1
1
t
tt
t nv
p
Mu
n
n =÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ-
+
+t . 
From (26) we solve 
1
1 )1( +
+ -
-
=
t
t n
EM
p
t
t
. Plugging this into (27) yields 
(28)   )('
1
)1(')1( 11 tttt nvn
M
E
nun =
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
-
-- ++ t
tt , 
which determines the equilibrium sequence of supplies. If the second period preferences 
are logarithmic, the dynamics is determined from the condition MEnvn tt /1)(' t-= , i.e. 
the economy stays forever at the steady state, n~ , determined from MEnvn /1)~('~ t-= . It 
is also interesting to note that the level of nominal money supply affects the intertemporal 
allocation in the presence of progressive taxation.   
  Now we ask: How does the steady state solution to (28) (denoted by n~ ) under 
progressive taxation compare to the steady state with proportional taxation, nˆ . The 
answer is given in  
 
Proposition 3. The steady state supply under progressive taxation is less than the supply 
with proportional taxation. 
Proof: We rewrite equation (28) in the steady state as 
)()('
1
)1(
')1(),;( nRHSnv
M
E
n
uEnLHS º=
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
-
-
-º t
t
tt . Given the Inada conditions we have 
0)0( =RHS  and ¥=
®
)(
lim
nRHS
Ln
, and 0)(' >nRHS . We also have 0),;( <EnLHSn t . 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15 See e.g. Friedman (1948), Musgrave and Miller (1948) and Slitor (1948). 
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We calculate 0
1
)1(
'')1)(1(),;( 2 <
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
-
-
--= -
M
E
n
nu
MM
E
EnLHSE t
ttt
tt  so that the 
),;( EnLHS t  shifts down, when tax exemption is increased. Proposition follows from 
this finding. Q.E.D. 
 
This proposition is not surprising, since in competitive models progressive taxation is 
more distortionary than the proportional taxation. A higher level of tax exemption 
decreases the steady state supply due to the negative income effect of tax exemption on 
supply.  
To explore the stabilizing effect of taxation on cycles we use the following 
notation in equation (28)  
(29)   [ ]
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
-
--º
M
E
nnuEnU
t
ttt
1
)1(')1(,;ˆ  and )(')(ˆ nnvnG = . 
Since function )(ˆ nG is monotone increasing we can invert it, and obtain from (29) the 
following relation 
(30)  [ ]( ) )(,;ˆˆ 111 ++- Fº= tEtt nEnUGn t , 
which is again the inverted reflected generational offer curve, where subscript E  refers to 
the case of progressive taxation. If there is no subscript in (30), it then refers to the case 
without taxation. We assume that there is at least a two-cycle in the economy without 
taxation (see Figure 1). As with proportional taxation the hump-shaped form of equation 
(30) is not necessary for two cycles, but it is necessary for three cycles.16  
Next we ask: Is there a progressive tax policy, which can stabilize the economy 
by eliminating cycles? We provide an answer in the following proposition.   
 
Proposition 4. Given the marginal tax rate there is a critical level of tax exemption, ,Eˆ  
such that for all ,EˆE <  there are no cycles in the economy. 
                                                               
16 See footnote 7 above. 
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Proof: Let 'n  be the maximum of the function )(nF  such that ')'( nn >F . The 
maximum for the function )(ntF is thus at )1/(' t-n , and for the function )(nEF  at 
)1/(')1( tt -- n
M
E . The maximizing point of )( 1+F tE n can then be increased by 
decreasing E  in such a way that ultimately we have for some E , say Eˆ , that 
)ˆ1/(')1()ˆ1/(')1( t
t
t
t
--<úû
ù
êë
é --F n
M
E
n
M
E
E . This also means that 0)
~('1 >F> nE , where 
n~  is the respective steady state, which in turn means that there can be no cycles. Q.E.D. 
 
Hence, according to Proposition 4 a sufficiently low progressive taxation – 
meaning that the average tax rate does not increase with the tax base too quickly - will 
eliminate cycles. 
Next we consider our example specified in section 3 above. Analogously to the 
derivation of the supply function with proportional taxes (c.f. equation 15) we get 
(31)   
tt
tt p
E
R
aRn
)1()1(
)1(
1
1
1
1
1
1 t
t
t
t ss
-
-
-
--=
+
--
+ , 
where the term, tpE / , is the real exemption. Differentiating (31) with respect to the tax 
rate, and exemption we get 
(32i)  
t
tt
t
p
EaRRn 2
11
1
1
1
2 )1()1(1)1( -+
-
+
- --
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
+-÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ ---=
¶
¶ tt
s
st
t
ss   
 (32ii)   
t
t
pE
n
)1( t
t
-
-=
¶
¶
. 
 
We find from (32i) that for a given interest factor decreasing the tax rate will decrease the 
supply (i.e. 0/ >¶¶ ttn ), if the marginal tax rate and tax exemption fulfill the following 
condition 
(33)  11
11
1 -+
+
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
-
-£ s
ss
s
st t
tt
R
p
E
R
a
. 
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Now we analyze the competitive equilibrium for this specification again with the 
assumption that 1>s . Using equation (28) we obtain 
(34)  t
t
t n
a
M
E
n
n
=
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
+
-
-
-
+
+
s
t
t
t
1
)1(
)1(
1
1 , 
where we calculate the steady sta te 
t
t
t
t s
-
----=
-
1
)1()1)(1(~
11 a
M
E
M
E
n .  This can be 
expressed in terms of the steady state with proportional taxation as  n
M
En ˆ)1(~ t-= . 
Hence, introducing tax exemption, which makes taxation progressive, decreases the 
steady state supply compared to the case with proportional taxation (see Proposition 3).   
 Differentiating (34) yields 
 
(35)  1
1
1
2
1
1
)1(
)1(
1
)1)(1(
+
+
+
+
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
+
-
-
-+
-
--
=
¶
¶
s
t
t
tt
ts
a
M
E
n
a
M
E
n
n
n
t
t
t
t . 
Evaluating the slope at the steady state we get 
(36)  
s
s
t
sts
1
1
1 )1(
)1)(1(
)~(
-
+--
==
¶
¶
+
a
nn
n
n
t
t
t , 
where the numerator must be negative. Inverting (36) and rearranging we get the stability 
condition for the local forward looking perfect foresight dynamics to be 
(37)  11
)1(
1 1 >-
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
-
-
st
s a . 
According to (37) increasing the tax rate can cause the economy to become 
unstable, i.e. if t  increases enough the inequality sign might turn around depending on 
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the relative size of parameters a  and s .17  Note that this condition is exactly the same 
(c.f. equation (21)) as with the presence of proportional taxation. This is due to the quasi-
linear specification of the lifetime utility function, which is strictly concave in 
consumption and linear in leisure and labor supply. Therefore the income effect of tax 
exemption is zero for consumption. 
Finally we consider an example where – unlike in the case of quasi-linear utility 
function - the income effect for consumption is not zero. We assume that disutility 
function ( )(nv ) is of the form 2)4/1()( nnv =  18, which gives the following equilibrium 
dynamics 
 
(38)  2
1
1
2
1
1
)1(
)1(
t
t
t n
a
M
E
n
n
=
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
+
-
-
-
+
+
s
t
t
t
. 
 
While we cannot explicitly solve for the steady state, we, however, get from (38) the 
following relation at the steady state 
(39)  );(
)1(2
1
)1(),,;( tt
t
tt
s
nRHS
n
a
M
E
nMEnLHS º-=
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
+
-
-º  . 
The left-hand side of (39) is an increasing, and the right-hand side a decreasing function 
of supply, .n  Furthermore, we see from (39) that 0)),,;( >MEnLHSE t . This means that 
an increase in the level of exemption will shift the ),,;( MEnLHS t  curve up, so that 
there is a negative relationship between the steady state employment and exemption, i.e. 
0/ <¶¶ En .  
                                                               
17 This can also be seen by differentiating the left-hand side of (37) with respect to the tax rate, and noting 
that the partial derivative will be negative. 
18 This kind of specification for the disutility function has been used in a different context by Farmer and 
Woodford (1997). 
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 Using (38) we compute 
(40)  
t
t
t
t
t
n
a
M
E
n
a
M
E
n
n
n 1
1
)1(
1
)1)(1(
)1(
1
1
1
1
´
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
+
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ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
+
-
--
-
=
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t
t
t
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t
, 
Again we concentrate on the case, where 1>s , so that the above slope can be negative. 
Next we evaluate the slope at the steady state. Using (39) and evaluating (40) at the 
steady state we obtain 
(41)  
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
+
-
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ú
ú
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û
ù
ê
ê
ê
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-
--+
-
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=
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n
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1
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1
)1(
*
1
. 
Developing (41) further yields 
(42)   
)1(2)1(2
)1()1)(1(
2
)1()1(
)1(1
*
1
M
Ean
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E
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E
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+
. 
Inverting (42) provides the following stability condition for the forward dynamics 
(43)  1
)1()1)(1(
)1(2)1(2
->
-+--
-+-
M
Ean
M
Ean
tts
tt
. 
Taking into account the fact that the denominator is negative we can re-express (43) as 
(44)  )1(3)1)(3(
M
E
an
t
ts ->-- , 
so that in this specification it is necessary for stability that 3>s . Since the steady state 
employment is a decreasing function of exemption, both sides of (44) are decreasing 
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functions of exemption. If the tax rate and/or the relative luxury, a , are small enough, we 
can see that increasing the level of exemption turns around the inequality sign in (44), 
and makes the steady state unstable. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We have studied the effects of distortionary tax policy on cycles and the local stability of 
equilibria in a simple overlapping generations model with a balanced budget rule.  In 
particular, we have explored the implications of the details of the tax system on these 
issues.  
We have shown that under proportional taxation the steady state supply exceeds 
(falls short of) the one without taxation, if the elasticity of the marginal utility of the 
second period consumption, is higher (lower) than one. This is because the higher (lower) 
steady state supply in the presence of taxation is due to the fact that the positive income 
effect of the tax rate dominates (is dominated by) the negative substitution effect. 
Moreover, in the presence of cycles there is a critical level of tax rate such that for all 
higher tax rates there are no cycles in the economy. The steady state supply under 
progressive taxation is less than the one with proportional taxation due to the negative 
income effect of tax exemption on supply. In this case there is a critical level of tax 
exemption, such that for all smaller tax exemptions there are no cycles in the economy. 
Hence, a sufficiently high tax rate and low tax progression eliminate cycles.  
We have also characterized the effects of tax policy on the local stability of 
equilibria by providing the following results. First, if the lifetime utility function is quasi-
linear, increasing the tax rate can cause the economy to become locally unstable both 
with proportional and linearly progressive taxation so that tax exemption does not matter. 
This is because the income effect of tax exemption is zero for consumption.  Second, if 
the lifetime utility function is not quasi-linear, then for small tax rate an increase in 
progression can locally destabilize the economy.   
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Appendix: 
 
                           Derivation of the Slutsky equation for the supply function  
 
Maximizing the utility function )()( nvcuU -=  subject to mnc +-= )1( t , where m  is 
non-labor income, gives )(')1)(('0 nvcuUn --== t , which implicitly defines the supply 
function ),( mnn t= . Substituting this for n in U gives the indirect utility function 
oUmU =),(* t  with the following properties: 0)(' ** >= cuUm  and .0
** <-= mnUUt Given 
the monotone *mU  we can invert the indirect utility function for m so that we have the 
following expenditure function, ),( oUhm t= . Substituting this for m in oUmU =),(* t  
yields the compensated indirect utility function19 oo UUhU =)),,((* tt with the following 
property 0** =+ tt UhUm  so that .
** nUUh m =-= tt  According to the duality theorem we 
can write the relationship between the uncompensated and compensated supply as 
follows ),()),,(( oco UnUhn ttt = . Differentiating this with respect to the tax rate gives 
c
m nhnn ttt =+  which can be written as the Slutsky equation  m
c nnnn -= tt  ,  
where we have the negative substitution effect, )0
)('')1)((''
)('
( 2 <--
=
nvcu
cu
nc
tt
, and the        
positive income effect, )0
)('')1)((''
)(''( 2 >--
=-
nvcu
ccunnm t
 . The latter (former) effect   
      evaluated at 0=m  dominates if .1)()( <>ns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                               
19 See Diamond and Yaari (1972). 
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